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Introduction
On a recent day, I used my credit cards in connection with a number of
minor transactions. I made eight purchases, and I paid two credit card bills. I
also discarded (without opening) three solicitations for new cards, balance
transfer programs, or other similar offers to extend credit via a credit card.
Statistics suggest that I am not atypical. U.S. consumers last year used credit
cards in about 100 purchasing transactions per capita, with an average value
of about $70. At the end of the year, Americans owed nearly $500 billion
dollars, in the range of $1,800 for every man, woman, and child in the popu1
lation. Although the individual credit card transaction is small and routine,
the transactions collectively have a significant effect on the overall stability
of many American families, leading to a rise in consumer borrowing and an
* Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law, Co-Director, Center for Law, Business & Economics, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 1982, Rice; J.D. 1985,
University of Texas. —Ed. I thank Oren Bar Gill and participants at the University of Michigan
“Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium for comments on an earlier version. I
also acknowledge the continuing generous support of the Marlow Preston Fund at the University of
Texas School of Law.
1.

See The Nilson Report No. 828, at 9 (Feb. 2005).
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2

increase in bankruptcy filing rates. The crux of the borrowing problem is
the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer, which the law relegates almost entirely to the private contractual relationships between those
groups. Yet the existing literature has done little to assess the unique contracting problems that those transactions present.
That is not to say that scholars have overlooked credit cards. On the contrary, some scholars have noticed the lengthy fine-print agreements that
issuers tender to their cardholders. Thus, credit cards have become a common topic in the boilerplate literature that culminates in the symposium for
3
which this Article is prepared. The branch of that literature focused on consumer contracts explores the extent to which voluminous terms in adhesion
contracts become enforceable without the type of voluntary and informed
4
assent on which the paradigm of contract law rests. At the same time, other
scholars have become increasingly concerned about the likelihood that cognitive and behavioral limitations restrict the ability of consumers to evaluate
5
borrowing transactions effectively.
Credit card contracts directly implicate both of those literatures because
the contracts are complex both in their literal form and in their economic
substance. Two features of the context make credit card contracting more
problematic than other consumer credit transactions. The first—suggested
by the description of my account activity—is that credit cards have their
effect in a large number of small transactions, each of which is so insignificant as to make careful consideration and calculating reflection impractical.
Second, and more fundamentally, the transactions occur over an extended
period, during which the business conditions that confront the issuer are
likely to change. What that means is that the terms on which the issuer extends credit and seeks repayment will need to change over time. Because it
is not cost-effective to engage in a separate contracting ritual for each purchase, the result in practice is a set of terms that are defined by the issuer
and changed with surprising frequency (often without meaningful notice to
the user). To understand the difference, consider a home mortgage transaction. If a consumer makes a mistake in a home mortgage transaction, the

2. See Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets Around the World chs. 4–5 (forthcoming 2006).
3. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L.
Rev. 679, 716–17; James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1693, 1700–01 (2000).
4. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 688; Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, StandardForm Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002).
5. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004); Susan BlockLieb & Edward Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behaviorism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=786427; Ron Harris & Adu Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of
Persuasion in Credit Advertisement, 7 J. Theoretical Inquiries in L. (forthcoming 2006); Cass R.
Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=772186; Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking & The Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2005-14, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=748286.
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consumer does so when she signs the documents, a point on which all of the
financial considerations of the relation turn.
A striking aspect of credit card contracts, however, is the comparative
lack of regulation. Other similarly important consumer financial transactions—like the home mortgage transaction and even the purchase of
insurance—display a common historical pattern, in which regulators or intermediaries have stepped in to standardize terms in a way that focuses
competition on the attributes of products that are most readily comprehensible to consumers. Those different regulatory approaches are provocative.
The Essay begins in Part I with a summary of the problems presented by
standardized terms in consumer transactions. Part II describes the contracting practices that dominate the modern credit card industry. I argue that
sophisticated card issuers have learned to exploit the boilerplate features of
their agreements to produce a set of dynamic contracting obligations that
even sophisticated cardholders could not understand. Finally, Part III analyzes several potential responses. First, I briefly explain my thoughts on
several proposals mentioned in the literature. In general, those proposals are
designed to improve consumer decisionmaking without limiting consumer
choice. I generally conclude that those proposals are not likely to be effective. Then, I discuss choice-limiting responses that have been used
effectively in other consumer finance contexts. I argue in favor of prohibiting terms that alter the consequences of borrowing after the fact. Those
terms make it very difficult for consumers to take account of the borrowing
costs at the time of their purchasing and borrowing decisions. More broadly,
I propose a centrally promulgated set of standardized terms that would leave
businesses free to compete on the key financial terms that consumers are
most likely to understand.
I. Problems with Boilerplate
Standardized contracts challenge the notion of informed consent upon
which a market economy depends. Yet all seem to agree that they are inevitable, because of the lower transaction costs associated with drafting,
6
bargaining, and allocating risks in a uniform way and because standardized
contracts allow large organizations to control the contracts to which their
7
agents bind them.
I begin by detailing a familiar litany of problems attributed to standardized
contracts. Because those problems rest on debatable empirical or experimental
premises, it is difficult to generalize about their effect on actual contracting
6. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 50–51 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay In Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 531 (1971).
7. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131, 144 (1970); Stewart
Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1058–60 (1966); Rakoff, supra note 6, at
1220–25.
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practices. Nevertheless, most would agree that some of these problems are
likely to affect some people at least some of the time.
A. Assent
Some of the most prominent questions in recent case law relate to the
contracting process, with a general focus on the robustness of the consumer’s assent. With standardized contracts, it often is hard to know which
documents compose the contract or when the contract is formed. A written
contract might refer to or incorporate other policies that may or may not be
8
presented at the same time, but are likely to have been written by a different
person at a different time. The terms might be presented in such a way that
the consumer does not necessarily have to see them to enter the contract. For
example, with the so-called browsewrap contracts that are used for website
terms of use, a website user might be held to accept the terms by using the
9
site even if the user does not actually locate and read the terms. There is a
similar problem with terms presented by hyperlink, or perhaps in a scrolla10
ble screen or pop-up screen. Another possibility is that the terms are
11
presented after the consumer has invested time or money in the transaction,
as is often the case with “pay-now terms-later” contracts that are common
12
13
14
for insurance policies, tickets, and packaged consumer products.
8. An obvious example is the airline ticket, which might incorporate by reference provisions
on limitation on liability, claim restrictions, rights of the carrier to change terms, rules about reservations, and covenants regarding the air carrier’s schedule. The full text of the terms must be available at
the airport and city ticket office of the airline, and provided by mail or other delivery service. See 49
U.S.C. § 41707 (2000); 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 (2005).
9. Consider the website for Amazon.com. Scrolling to the bottom of the entry screen, you see
hyperlinks for “Conditions of Use” (a 70-paragraph, 2400-word document) and “Privacy Notice” (a 5paragraph, 2400-word document). Although those policies purport to bind anyone who visits the site,
someone who orders a product will eventually come to a “Place Order” screen that states that “[b]y
placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and conditions of use.” The contract of
purchase is not complete until Amazon.com sends an e-mail verifying shipment.
10.
2005).

E.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., No. 5-03-0643, 2005 WL 1968774 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 12,

11. Credit card account agreements raise this concern to the extent that consumers cannot
choose an issuer based on the issuer’s card agreement without investing the time to open an account. If
those agreements were readily available over the Internet (something I advocate below), this might
change, because cardholders would be better able to select credit card issuers based on comparing
information available to them on the Internet. Of course, credit card agreements then might raise the
other presentation problems that presently plague e-commerce transactions.
12. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198
(1917) (noting that policies are often delivered after the customer has spent time to complete and file an
application); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 39 (1984) (same).
13. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(decrying the Court’s enforcement of exculpatory boilerplate language in a cruise ticket provided after
the ticket was purchased, at which point the average passenger would accept the risk of injury rather
than risk cancelling a planned vacation at the last minute).
14. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (computer equipment
shipped with terms in box, at which point customer has incurred shipping costs and search costs);
Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 99,991, 2005 WL 1519233 (Okla. June 28, 2005) (same).
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Finally, and of particular import for my project, the contract may be subject to unilateral modification by the drafter. Even where bilateral
modification is required due to regulatory constraint or the drafter’s failure
to reserve the unfettered right to amend, acceptance may be established by
15
notice and continued performance. For continuing contracts, the notion of
assent can be illusory. If the notice is not readable or is presented in a way
that does not reach the consumer in an effective way, the consumer might
not be aware of the modified terms. Similarly, even a consumer that reads
the notice might be unable or disinclined to comply with an available optout right.
B. Readability
A second set of concerns, assuming that the consumer in fact has seen
the relevant documents, falls under the heading of readability. Is the font
size too small? Is the agreement too long? Is it written in a language that the
consumer can understand? Does it use jargon that obscures the plain meaning of the words? Does the lack of tailoring to the transaction mean that
large parts of the agreement do not apply? Does the agreement fit the actual
transaction?
The severity of readability problems depends on the nature of the transaction. The example often used to illustrate this point is the rental car
contract. Consider the eight-page, foldout rental car agreement, with very
small print and loaded with complex terminology, many of the terms of
which would apply only to subsets of customers selecting particular service
packages. This document is likely to be functionally unreadable, especially
when it is presented for the first time at the counter, to a customer who has
just completed a lengthy plane flight, perhaps accompanied by a number of
small children, often late at night, and generally with numerous other people
waiting in line in the same tiny office space. Aside from the circumstances
of presentation, the reality is that the typical consumer contract requires a
level of literacy and reading comprehension that is far beyond the grasp of
16
the normal American.
Yet, would it be more readable if it were twelve pages of larger print or if
it were sixteen pages of twelve-point type with clearer definitions? Would it
make more sense if the counterperson had a higher level of education or training and were able to choose one of several different contracts that more
accurately described the circumstances of the transaction? As Macaulay
teaches us, a decision to enforce such contracts as written cannot rest on the
idea that a man is bound to a written contract because he has chosen to accept

15. See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was acceptance of contract with long distance carrier established by customer’s continued use of services after
receiving customer agreement).
16. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 233, 235–41 (2002) (discussing incomprehensibility of financial disclosures).
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its terms. Yet, if we would not enforce a contract written in lemon juice
18
(legible to the sophisticate with a candle), where do we draw the line to
permit enforcement of a contract where the type is legible? Is six-point type
big enough? What about three-point type? Surely, the answer must have
something to do with the substance of the form and the business conditions
that motivate the way in which it is presented.
Readability problems are not traditionally within the purview of the basic doctrinal tools of contract law, except to the extent that they render the
19
contract unconscionable. Rather, responses have come from a variety of ad
hoc quasi-regulatory consumer protection initiatives. For example, font-size
20
requirements apply in certain types of transactions. A number of states
have plain-language initiatives that require approval of forms by some cen21
tralized agency. In addition, there are often requirements that certain types
22
of contracts be written in the language in which the transaction proceeded.
Only occasionally is there any comprehensive effort to respond to readabil23
ity concerns.
C. Fragmentary Contracts
Another basic aspect of the standardized form is that the written document need not contain all, or even most of, the terms of the transaction.
Thus, in many of the most common examples of standardized terms, the
document captures only a few of the relevant terms. For example, an event
ticket might include only the date and time of the event and (on the back in
smaller type) a detailed exculpatory clause protecting the exhibitor. A warranty typically will describe the product features (and perhaps what the
manufacturer does not promise in regards to the product) but omit the terms
of the sales transaction. Similarly, a typical sales receipt might note the date

17. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1051, 1080–81. Rakoff makes the same point: “The traditional treatment requires that adherents to form contracts be treated as if they had read and
understood the document presented to them, even if that conclusion is false and known by the other
party to be so.” Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1187.
18.

The example is Macaulay’s. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1056.

19. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s enforcement of choice-of-forum clause in the fine print on the back of a
ticket that only the “most meticulous passenger” would have seen).
20.
actions).

E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (2005) (holder-in-due-course notice in consumer credit trans-

21. See 7 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 1.1201–1.1247 (2005) (“Plain Language Contract Provisions” for Texas consumer credit transactions); Tex. Fin. Code § 341.502 (2004) (requiring
specified types of consumer loans, “whether in English or Spanish, [to] be written in plain language
designed to be easily understood by the average consumer” and requiring creditors to use either
administratively drafted models or contracts previously approved by the finance commission);
White & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 260.
22. See, e.g., 7 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.1(c)(5) (2005) (requiring Spanish translation of home
loan notices “if the transaction is conducted primarily in Spanish”).
23. See N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, Final Report Relating to Standard Form Contracts (1998), available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/contract.pdf.
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and time of the transaction and the price and tax paid, but omit any discussion of the return policy.
Fragmentation often occurs in areas in which the law might require a
specific term to be included in a contract. Thus, for example, we might see a
fine-print document that includes little more than rules purporting to limit
the consumer’s right to sue, either substantively (through disclaimers of
warranties) or procedurally (through choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, or ar24
bitration provisions). Still, fragmentation occurs even in lengthy
boilerplate agreements. For example, consider a case in which the drafter
might benefit from including some terms in writing, such as an arbitration
clause or a choice-of-forum clause. If the drafter has little incentive to define other relevant terms in writing, even a lengthy standardized agreement
25
might not memorialize all of the terms of the transaction.
D. Choice
The preceding sections deal with how readily the consumer can learn the
terms of the arrangement before the consumer chooses to enter a transaction
with the drafter. From an economic perspective, it is that point—the moment
of choice—that is significant. We value contracts in a free market economy
largely because they facilitate decentralized and informed decisionmaking
26
about the allocation of resources in the economy. However, that judgment
only makes sense when the parties not only are aware of the risks and opportunities of their transactions, but also evaluate those risks in a rational
27
way in making the choice to transact.
In the world of standardized terms and contracts, the range of choice is
quite narrow. Negotiation is typically not an option. The consumer’s only
substantial options are to accept the terms presented, continue shopping for
other potential providers, or abandon the purchase altogether. If the document is likely to be hard to read and even harder to revise, a rational
28
consumer might not expend the effort to review the terms. Likewise, the
consumer’s willingness to read the document certainly will be affected by

24. See James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2005) (enforcing arbitration
provision incorporated by reference in language affixed to french-fry carton); see also John J.A.
Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 285, 292 (2000)
(presenting results of empirical study finding that “[m]ost short contracts were printed on a written
receipt and addressed two issues: scope of warranty and limitation of liability”).
25. Thus, in the credit card context, the issuer has little incentive to explain the limited implications of paying an “annual” fee or obtaining a card with an expiration date.
26.

See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1058.

27. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471 (1998).
28. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 63 (1987); Gillette, supra note 3; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003); see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. b (1979) (“A party who makes regular use of a
standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to
read the standard terms.”).
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the social setting in which it is proffered—something that often is entirely
29
within the control of the merchant.
In the case in which the consumer does read the document, attention is
likely to focus on a few of the more significant terms rather than the document
30
as a whole. If much of the document addresses legal risks and conditions that
are not within the everyday experience of the typical consumer, the consumer
might err in assessing the likelihood that those conditions will occur. The con31
sumer might not weigh the severity of the ensuing consequences accurately.
Moreover, the consumer’s own preferences may shift over time. Finally, consumers may have bounded willpower, meaning that they may take actions that
32
conflict with their own long-term interest.
The significance of those defects is open to debate. For example, in markets in which segmentation is difficult and in which errors are random, a
relatively small number of heroically rational customers might drive contract33
ing markets to competitive terms. In other markets, in which merchants
easily can segment their customers, or in which those that err in assessing risk
will do so in a predictable and systematic way, these defects may cause con34
sumers in the market to make choices that are systematically suboptimal.
II. Credit Card Account Agreements
A. Context
The first point to make about the issuer–cardholder relationship is that it
begins in a way that satisfies traditional doctrinal concerns about assent. The
card agreement is typically the product of a solicitation that contains the
terms expected to matter most to the cardholder and on which the card issuer competes. Issuers sent more than five billion direct mail solicitations in
2004, for an average of more than five offers per month to more than sev35
enty percent of U.S. households. Although the response rate typically is
29.

See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1061.

30. I amplify this point below, discussing literature that emphasizes the limited number of
attributes (typically no more than 3–5) that a typical individual can compare in making market
choices.
31. This could be true because of simple (and presumably random) error, or because of a
systematic bias related to optimism or availability.
32.
below).

The most obvious example here is hyperbolic discounting (which I discuss in more detail

33. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 691–93; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 1387 (1983).
34. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 772–79 (1993); Gillette, supra note 3, at 691–93; Jon
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for
Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 154–58 (1990); see also Rakoff, supra note 6, at
1231 (arguing that results of competition say nothing about consumer preferences when contracts
are not in fact understood by consumers).
35. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, The Profitability of Credit Card
Operations of Depositary Institutions 5 (2005) [hereinafter Federal Reserve, 2005 Report],
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36

quite low, tens of millions responded last year by submitting a credit card
application. The solicitation is followed by the submission of an application
by a cardholder, which is followed upon acceptance by the issuance of a
37
card and a cardholder agreement. Typically, that process is followed by the
requirement that the card be validated over the telephone—the telephone
validation occurs after the cardholder has received the agreement and before
the card is used. Thus, to generalize, the contracting process is still primarily
paper-based, and the assent is more robust than in the electronic contracting
practices challenged so often in recent litigation.
It is less clear, however, that a cardholder of reasonable care and intellectual capability can be expected to read or understand the agreement. Credit
card contracts share many of the features of other standardized agreements.
Thus, they are relatively complex. A typical credit card agreement, for example, might have about eight single-spaced pages of small (seven-point) type,
including about eighty separately numbered provisions. Many of the terms in
the agreement are comprehensible only for cardholders with specialized
knowledge. For example, financial terms such as “annual percentage rate” or
“APR” assume proficiency with interest calculations, and legal terms such as
arbitration, forum, and default assume an advanced understanding of the legal
process. Further, a single account may have multiple APRs that apply to different types of credit extensions or different periods.
The likelihood that the cardholder will have cards from multiple issuers
only exacerbates the complexity of the relationships. Although most consumers have only one deposit account, the typical cardholder, and especially
the frequent borrower, is likely to have several different cardholder agree38
ments. They also are likely to contain choice-of-law provisions that select
the laws of different states. Moreover, unlike the issuers of home mort39
40
gages or insurance policies, to take the closest parallels, each credit card
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2005/ccprofit.pdf (discussing industry study that shows that an estimated 5.23 billion direct mail solicitations were sent by
issuers during 2004, up 22% from 4.29 billion in 2003, with 71% of U.S. households receiving an
average of 5.7 offers per month).
36.
0.4 %).

Id. (noting that the response rate on credit card solicitations in 2004 was estimated to be

37. I am not aware of any issuers that make their standard forms available to consumers
either online or with solicitation materials so that consumers can compare terms before submitting
an application.
38. As of the end of 2004, there were more than two credit card accounts for every man,
woman, and child in the United States, including about 430 million credit card accounts from Visa
and MasterCard, The Nilson Report, No. 828, at 6 (Feb. 2005), 50 million from Discover, The
Nilson Report, No. 831, at 9 (Apr. 2005), 115 million from in-house store card programs, The
Nilson Report, No. 838, at 8 (July 2005), and 30 million from American Express, The Nilson
Report, No. 826, at 7 (Jan. 2005).
39. See Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 271, 284–85 (2002) (discussing the development of the standard residential real estate
mortgage by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)); Ronald J. Mann, Searching
for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 951, 971 (1997) (same).
40. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 32 (3d ed. 2000)
(“[S]tandardization in insurance . . . involves . . . an offer of the same policy, to all customers, by all

MANN FINAL.DOC

908

2/17/2006 8:42 AM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:899

issuer is likely to use a standardized agreement that is in form (if not substance) different in several respects from the forms of other major issuers.
Thus, the cardholder who wants to maintain a comprehensive understanding
of the status of cardholder agreements will need to understand the relevant
legal rules in the applicable states, will need to study a different agreement
for each card, and will need to remember as cards are pulled from the wallet
which agreement corresponds to each card. This in a world in which few
consumers are likely even to notice, much less retain, the relevant agreements as they arrive in their stack of daily junk mail.
Another point is that it is not always easy for a layperson to determine
which papers constitute the agreement for each card. The current Bank of
America agreement, for example, consists of a separately printed eight-page
standardized form, together with a set of “Additional Disclosures” that appear in the billing statement at the bottom of a sheet labeled “Important
Summary of Changes to Your Account.” The cardholder who skips the
summary after reading the agreement would fail to notice such additional
terms as a default provision that permits Bank of America to impose a penalty APR of about ten percent per annum more than the standard APR.
Finally, a cardholder also would need to monitor the frequent amendments of each of the agreements. It is typical for major issuers to amend
their agreements in important respects with remarkable frequency. Amendments are not the typical bargained-for modifications of contract theory.
Rather, the typical agreement reserves to the issuer the right to amend the
agreement at any time, with the issuer promising at best that it will provide
notice of the amendments. When it does provide notice, the notice typically
is in the form of a new agreement included in a billing statement together
with a variety of other promotional materials. The cardholder who uses a
41
rule of thumb to discard all marketing information that comes with bills is
42
likely to fail to notice such amendments.
To be sure, issuers obtain consent before applying some new financial
terms, but consent is inferred from such actions as continuing to use the card
after notice of the amendment or failure to close the account and send a
43
prompt written objection to the amendment. Importantly, amendments
companies. Competition in insurance markets, therefore, often tends to be over price, quality of
service, or reliability, but rarely over the terms of coverage itself.”).
41. See Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on
the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev.
329 (1986) (discussing the prevalence of such rules as techniques for managing complex choices).
42. As a matter of traditional contract doctrine, it is not plain that such amendments are
enforceable. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998) (declining to enforce “bill-stuffer” amendment that added arbitration term even though cardholder did not close or
stop using account upon receipt of amendment with bill). However, several key states explicitly
permit amendments based on notices enclosed with billing statements followed by subsequent card
use. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 952 (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 7-5-4(c) (2004); see also Strand v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005) (holding that bill-stuffer amendment waiving
the right to file a class action was procedurally unconscionable, but enforceable because the term
was not substantively unconscionable).
43. Issuers have used a variety of different opt-out provisions in “change in terms” clauses.
Some require that a consumer opt out of the modified terms in ways that might not be feasible or
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typically apply to funds already borrowed. For example, a change in the
44
terms of default might substantially increase the interest rate the cardholder
will pay on balances outstanding at the time of the amendment.
In evaluating the contracting problems that the card presents, it is important to remember the unusual nature of the reciprocal obligations on which
the relationship rests. On the cardholder’s side, there is no commitment to
use the card. Moreover, even if the card is used, timely payments often obviate any obligation to pay interest or fees. Nor is the lack of a commitment
illusory. In many (perhaps most) cases, the cardholder can switch credit
sources easily. Viewed on a purchase-by-purchase basis, the typical cardholder makes a different decision for each transaction when deciding which
card to present at the checkout counter.
On the issuer’s side, there is a similar evanescence of obligation inherent
in the business of card issuance. As with most lending transactions, the
lender is not in any practical sense obligated to lend until the moment at
which the lender actually extends funds to the borrower. Rather, the parties
proceed on the useful rule of thumb that absent an unforeseen change of
circumstances it normally will be profitable for the lender to extend the
credit for which the lender has expended time and energy to structure a
transaction. Issuers deal with the possibility of such changes by reserving
45
the right to refuse to extend credit on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If
this were not permitted, issuers would be deprived of the ability to terminate
accounts based on deterioration of the borrower’s credit over time. It would
also make it difficult to respond to concerns about unauthorized use.
More broadly, because interest rates and the competitive landscape
change rapidly, credit card issuers require a great deal of flexibility to operate. Forcing an issuing bank to adhere to credit terms in a dynamic
economic environment would not promote an efficient credit relationship.
desirable for all accountholders. Those ways include notice and immediate repayment of the entire
outstanding balance, see Shea v. Household Bank (SB), Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (2003)
(holding that failure to repay outstanding balance not sufficient “use” to support bilateral modification), or notice and deferred repayment of the outstanding balance at a penalty rate, see Rossman v.
Fleet Bank R.I. Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 388, 398 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that interest rate would
increase from 7.99% to 24.99% upon closure of account). Others more generously permit opt out
based on notice and discontinuation of use of the card or, even easier, notice with the right to continue using the card under the current terms until the end of the membership year or expiration date
on the card.
44. To give context, one major issuer recently amended its agreement to provide that it can
charge its default rate to any cardholder who is late or overlimit twice in a single year. Thus, a cardholder with a $12,000 annual limit that makes two $50 overlimit transactions on a single day might
be exposed to a default rate on the existing $12,000 of debt, even if that type of conduct would not
have been an event of default at the time the funds were borrowed. This could reflect, for example, a
shift from a model in which issuers welcome overlimit transactions as an identifier of illiquid borrowers likely to pay interest, to a model in which issuers rely on cognitive difficulties that
cardholders face in tracking their outstanding balances to collect fees on accidental overlimit transactions by liquid borrowers.
45. Some courts have rejected the argument that payment of an annual fee precludes the
issuer from modifying or terminating the agreement for that period. E.g., Gaynoe v. First Union
Direct Bank, No. 97 CVS 16536, 2001 WL 34000142, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2001) (holding that annual fees are not fees paid for services to be performed over time, but rather in
consideration of issuing a card).
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That is not to say that lenders cannot commit at one time to provide credit at
some specified future date. It is to say, however, that lenders typically
charge for such a commitment and that the absence of a commitment (and
related fee) from the credit card market should surprise nobody. Thus, market conditions require that issuers retain some ability to modify the terms of
46
their agreements.
As suggested above, the difficulty of obtaining individual consents from
large numbers of cardholders has led issuers generally to reserve the right to
change the terms of their agreements when cardholders use their cards after
47
receiving notice of the change. In the context of the business model, however, that provision is less onerous than it might seem at first glance. Given
the lack of obligation—on either side—it makes more sense to view each
separate purchase transaction as a separate agreement between the cardholder and card issuer that is completed when the card issuer agrees to
extend credit for a particular transaction that the cardholder wishes to en48
ter. When the cardholder decides to borrow funds from the lender, it
borrows them on the terms available from the issuer at that point, just as we
purchase a CD from a bank at the interest rate available on the day we contact the bank to purchase it.
B. Ramifications
The key question is whether consumers on the ground are making
choices with sufficient care and rationality to drive the market to a competitive and optimal set of products and prices. These are complex relationships.
It is unlikely that the typical consumer will be able to evaluate all of the attributes of the transaction that have economic significance.
I draw here on a long-standing body of experimental literature indicating
that the ability of a typical consumer to evaluate separate attributes declines
49
rapidly after the number of relevant attributes exceeds three. Applied to
this particular context, Jeffrey Davis has conducted an empirical study of

46. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1–226.36, requires a credit card issuer to give fifteen
days written notice of a change in terms if the term was required to be disclosed initially under 12
C.F.R. § 226.6 or the required minimum payment is increased. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2005). The
fifteen-day advance notice requirement does not apply if a rate or fee is increased due to the customer’s default, and the notice requirement does not apply at all if the change involves late payment
charges, over-the-limit charges or other specified occurrences.
47. See White, supra note 3, at 1700–01 (asserting that modification of credit card agreements following notice and use is consistent with the objective theory of contracts and practical
necessity).
48. See Garber v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that a separate contract was created each time the card was used according to the terms of the
cardholder agreement at the time of such use).
49. See James R. Bettman, An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice
(1979); David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search
and Disclosure, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 296–97 (1986); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process
and as Product of Thought, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 13 (1978); see also Block-Lieb & Janger, supra
note 5, § III(A)(1) (reviewing the literature).
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50

consumer comprehension of consumer finance agreements, using an
51
agreement much less complicated than a modern credit card agreement.
Davis found that most consumers that read the agreement could not understand most of its terms. Davis’s findings emphasize in particular the
difficulty that consumers face in understanding terms that involve complex
52
concepts that are not common in daily experience. Although the study is
relatively informal, its findings do dovetail with the reality of the modern
credit card agreement. In particular, a consumer must account for costs and
fees that differ from card to card and shift over time (often after the purchase in question), as well as complex concepts of default and a litany of
53
fees payable as a consequence of specified actions. In reality, we cannot
think it likely that consumers understand most of the terms even when they
do review the agreements.
Rather, decision theory suggests, the rational approach for the typical
cardholder will be to select a product based on a small number of price and
service attributes that are of obvious relevance, recognizing that the remaining terms of the agreement are nonnegotiable. For example, a consumer
would be likely to select a bank based solely on the cost of writing checks,
the minimum balance required to avoid a monthly fee, and the location and
fees for using automated teller machines to withdraw cash. In the case of a
credit card contract, empirical research suggests a typical consumer selects a
card based on the brand, annual fee, grace period, affinity or rewards benefits, and the stated interest rate if the consumer expects to pay interest in the
54
immediate future. Because those terms are contained in the advertising
materials, consumers in most cases are unlikely even to look at the contract.
Thus, a consumer of typical decisionmaking capacity would not rationally
consider the terms defining or explaining the consequences of late payment
or excessive borrowing, even though they generate a substantial share of
issuer revenue (in the form of fees and default APRs). If consumers do not
consider those terms, there is a concern that issuers will not draft them in a
55
competitive way.

50. Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 841 (1977).
51. The agreement is set forth in an appendix to Davis’s article. Id. app. A at 908–11. It is
perhaps one-quarter the length of a modern credit cardholder agreement.
52.

See id. at 854–56.

53. See Philip Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 134–
35 (1962) (discussing some of the detailed legal acumen required for understanding consumer credit
contracts).
54. Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Relationships Among Information Search Activities
When Shopping for a Credit Card, 34 J. Consumer Affairs 330 (2000) (documenting rarity with
which consumers evaluate anything other than the most basic financial terms).
55. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 34, at 154–58 (discussing lack of competitive pressure
on terms not examined by consumers); Korobkin, supra note 28 (explaining why—when contract
terms are not within the limited number of attributes that consumers are expected to price—drafting
parties will have an incentive to include terms that favor themselves regardless of whether the terms
are efficient).
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A second concern, one to which legal academics have paid considerably
more attention, is the likelihood that consumers would not price the risks of
card agreements accurately even if they did invest the time and attention
necessary to understand and evaluate the relevant financial terms. Tom Jackson has suggested that systematic failures in the cognitive process cause
individuals to underestimate the risks that their current consumption im56
poses on their future well-being. Building on that point, recent behavioral
economics literature suggests that consumers give excessive weight to the
conspicuous “up-front” aspects of a relationship and inadequate weight to
57
less conspicuous “back-end” terms.
The pricing problem is associated with several related cognitive
tendencies. One is a so-called “optimistic” bias, which leads people to
underestimate the likelihood of adverse events—in this case, to
underestimate both the likelihood that they would suffer financial distress
58
and the costs that the distress would impose on them. Another is an
“availability” bias, which leads people to overweigh the probability of
common occurrences (which are readily available to their decisionmaking
faculties) and underweigh the probability of uncommon occurrences. If
financial distress is an uncommon event, that bias might cause consumers to
59
underweigh the likelihood and consequences of financial distress. Another
concern is hyperbolic discounting. Generally, this causes consumers to make
intertemporal comparisons that are unstable over time—so that future
behavior will be systematically inconsistent with present predictions of that
60
61
behavior. In this context, it can lead to excessive borrowing.

56. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1393, 1410–14 (1985).
57. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=728545 (summarizing literature).
58. See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Presenting Risk Information, in W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and Worker
Responses to Hazard Information 13, 17 (1987); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 654–58
(1999); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 806, 809–12 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 40 (2004); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 208
(1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and
Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 991 (2005).
60. See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in Choice over Time 57,
69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. Econ. 353 (2004); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1539–40 (1998); David
Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443 (1997).
61.

Bar-Gill, supra note 5, at 1375–76; DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 60.
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The concerns those tendencies justify are exacerbated if card issuers are
62
in a position to exploit them. David Laibson and his co-author have identified a strategy that they call “shrouding,” in which merchants identify a
myopic or satisficing class of customers and exploit the lack of rationality
by systematically backloading the less attractive terms into a less prominent
63
time and place in the relationship. Stewart Macaulay’s work on credit cards
before the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) suggests that card issuers used
similar techniques to make cardholders responsible for the losses from stolen cards. At that time, the strategy was to omit any language about lost
cards from the application and then include a fine-print clause on the back
of the card indicating that the cardholder was responsible for all transactions
in which the card was presented (even if the transaction was conducted by a
64
thief with a stolen card). Similarly, Oren Bar-Gill’s article on credit card
contracting argues specifically that credit card companies use pricing features such as teaser rates to take advantage of a quasi-rationally elevated
concern for near-term costs as opposed to long-term costs for market prod65
ucts that depend on systematic underestimation of borrowing costs.
Those strategies are less successful where competition can “debias”
markets. Consider, for example, how the entry of Netflix has trumped the
66
earlier shrouding strategy on which Blockbuster relied. Generally, Blockbuster’s profit model in the early years of this decade coupled low rental
fees with high late fees. If consumers underestimated the amount of late fees
or the probability that they would pay them, they would underestimate the
costs of renting from Blockbuster. By designing a product that exploited that
error, Blockbuster increased its short-term profits. Netflix responded with a
two-pronged approach: a pricing model that does not involve late fees and
an education strategy designed to create an aversion to late fees. It is too
soon to tell whether the Netflix approach will result in a long-term market
67
position for Netflix, but it did disrupt Blockbuster’s profit model.

62. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 58; Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1231 (noting that “intense
competition will, if anything, make the situation worse, for it tends toward degradation of any [consumer]-protective provisions of the contract”).
63. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57 (presenting model that explains why firms shroud
the negative attributes of their products, particularly high prices for complementary add-ons, and
shows why competition will not induce firms to reveal information that would improve market
efficiency).
64.

Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1069–74.

65. See Bar-Gill, supra note 5; see also Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the
Credit Card Market (June 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Michigan Law Review). The
suspicion that credit card issuers try to hide the terms that are harmful to consumers is not a new
one. Macaulay’s work on credit cards before the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1642
(West 2004), suggests that card issuers used similar techniques to make cardholders responsible for
the losses from stolen cards. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1069–74.
66. See David Leonhardt, All Consuming; Why That Doggie in the Window Costs More Than
You Think, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2005, at C5.
67. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57 (pointing out that it is difficult for any single firm
to capture the profits from debiasing consumers).
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As the Blockbuster–Netflix example suggests, educating consumers of
both front-end and back-end costs can disrupt a profit model that relies on
back-end costs. In the credit card context, issuers at one time might have
been vulnerable to sophisticated cardholders who avoid the payment of interest and fees by using a card with no annual fee and making timely
68
monthly payments. Thus, as the number of sophisticated users grew, it became increasingly difficult for card issuers to profit by hiding expensive
back-end interest payments.
The complexity of the modern credit card transactional structure minimizes the likelihood that issuers will be forced to use transparent pricing
models without regulatory intervention. The Blockbuster–Netflix example
describes a single market segment with a shrouding technique that was destabilized when consumers were encouraged to develop accurate perceptions
of their future behavior. Modern credit card issuers, however, have used at
least two tactics to prevent increased customer sophistication from destabi69
lizing their profit models.
The first tactic has been to develop product features that segment the
market into smaller niches. The discussion above describes a single creditcard product, offered to all customers. That product was attractive to the
sophisticated because it was free and to the unsophisticated because they
failed to understand either the costs of the product or their likely use of it.
Responding to the growth of card users that do not borrow, issuers in recent
years have developed a number of different products that prevent increased
sophistication. For example, the sophisticated cardholder who wishes not to
pay interest and fees is likely to be attracted to an affinity or rewards card
issued by MBNA. For that product, the cardholder is likely to pay an annual
70
fee, which the sophisticated user will rationalize as costing less than the
value of the rewards (frequent flyer miles or the like). There is every reason
71
to expect that the cardholder’s calculation often will be incorrect. Moreover, those calculations accord no weight to the value of the information
72
MBNA obtains from the relationship. Even if that calculation is correct, the
new product certainly has made the relationship more profitable on a cardholder-by-cardholder basis than it was in years past, when there might have
been a direct cross-subsidization between convenience users and borrowers.

68. See id. at 5 (noting that sophisticated credit card users take advantage of “free miles” and
avoid interest rate charges and late payment fees).
69. See id. (noting that innovation creates new opportunities for shrouding and undermines
the effects of education).
70. The card issuer also may receive a higher interchange fee for these cards, which might be
passed back to consumers at the point of sale in the form of higher prices.
71. The emphasis here is on rationalization, not rational calculation. Macaulay’s early study
compared contracts for gasoline cards (issued primarily to less wealthy individuals) and travel and
entertainment (“T&E”) cards issued to more wealthy individuals. He provides some interesting
empirical evidence suggesting that the wealthy are no more likely to “debias” than the impecunious—perhaps because their sense that their time is more valuable decreases the likelihood that they
will pay attention to details of small transactions. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1086–1107.
72.

MBNA’s annual reports explain in detail the valuable uses it makes of that information.
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The concept of segmentation is not a new one. As Lizabeth Cohen explains in A Consumer’s Republic, the strategy of segmenting consumers into
ever more finely delineated classes has been a dominant strategy for a half
century. It was identified in the 1950s in academic writings by people like
Wendell Smith and Pierre Martineau, and swiftly transformed the business
73
models of all U.S. businesses aiming at consumers.
The second tactic is to take advantage of the fact that consumers are
likely to have multiple account agreements, all of which are likely subject to
frequent unilateral modifications, both of which work together to hinder
consumer understanding. If each issuer has a different set of rules, and if the
pitfalls hidden in the rules differ for each issuer and from time to time, only
the most careful cardholder will avoid any level of interest or fees. The point
of this tactic is that within each of the market segments described above,
even for the cardholders that attempt to position themselves as nonborrowing convenience users, it will require an increasing level of attention
to detail to successfully avoid paying fees to the issuer.
If I am right, those strategies make the card industry more resistant to
debiasing than parallel industries. That leaves us with a basic policy question: how to regulate a contracting market in which a seller faces a
heterogeneous set of purchasers, some but not all of whom are sufficiently
careful and sophisticated to respond rationally to the terms offered by the
seller. As discussed above, we know that if purchasers are homogeneous in
their preferences, a relatively small number of sophisticated customers can
produce competition in the market that will drive the seller to offer an efficient product. Alternatively, if purchasers are heterogeneous in their
preferences but are always sophisticated, then each purchaser will respond
rationally to the terms offered by the seller. We would expect this to be the
case, for example, in relatively high-dollar markets. We are left here, however, with the case that falls between those simple cases: a market in which
only some customers understand the offered terms, and in which the choices
of those customers do not produce competition that alters the terms available to the other customers. The existing theoretical literature, I think it is
fair to say, has not worked out how to analyze potential regulatory responses
in that context.
III. Responding to Problems with Credit Card Agreements
If the allocation of risks in existing cardholder agreements is not the result of effective competition or rational choice by cardholders, the natural
question is whether and, if so, how the law should respond. Lawrence
Friedman describes a common pattern of consumer regulation. After an industry develops to a point where a stable set of products and transactions
has developed, the typical response is for the legislature to step in and transfer those areas “from the realm of abstract contract law” to the realm of
73. See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America 292–309 (2003).
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74

economic regulation. As Stewart Macaulay explains, we can view this as a
75
process by which commercial areas “spin off” for special treatment.
For example, as the mail order industry grew in size, the FTC adopted a
set of standardized contract terms, eliminating competition on terms that
consumers are unlikely to notice. The FTC Mail Order Rule establishes a set
of procedures that retailers must follow if they are unable to ship goods
within the time they estimate at the time they take the order. If the delay is
moderate, they must give the customer an opportunity to cancel the order. If
the delay is extreme, they must cancel the order unless the customer explic76
itly consents to the extension. We can imagine that in the absence of such a
rule, retailers might have different terms in their contracts to deal with the
possibility of delayed shipments. We also can be sure that few consumers
would examine and analyze those terms. Therefore, even if the FTC delay
term is not optimal, it does serve to focus competition in that industry on the
price, selection, and quality of delivered products, terms customers are most
likely to notice.
Viewing the regulatory framework within that paradigm, it is striking
how little the existing law does to regulate the credit card agreement. Most
of the rules that govern credit card transactions are found in the Truth in
77
Lending Act (“TILA”) and Regulation Z. The legal regime defined by
78
those rules is primarily a disclosure-based system, but it does impose several substantive constraints on the practices of card issuers. Specifically,
79
TILA prohibits banks from issuing unsolicited credit cards to consumers.
TILA also has several provisions relating to unauthorized use and merchant

74. Lawrence Friedman, Contract Law in America 140–83 (1965). I write consciously
in a line of recent scholarship that analyzes how responses to social problems that traditionally are
characterized as “public” and “private” in fact are closely intertwined and interdependent. E.g.,
Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social
Benefits in the United States (2002); David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: The Government as Ultimate Risk Manager (2002).
75.

Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1056.

76.

FTC Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (2005).

77. Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 132, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1642 (West 2004); Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. §§ 225, 226 (2005). The Uniform Commercial Code does not cover payment cards. See
U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) (2002) (“ ‘Item’ . . . does not include . . . a credit or debit card slip.”). But see
Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Barton-Russell Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (reaching a
contrary conclusion under pre-revision Article 4). Although some states have enacted statutes that
govern certain aspects of the issuer/cardholder relationship, it seems fair to say that none of those
statutes has any significant impact, largely because the National Bank Act would preempt any substantial regulation. See Mark Furletti, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of
State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 425 (2004). To the extent there is any
substantive regulation by the states, it tends to be very specific statutes authorizing specific business
practices, like the Delaware bill-stuffer statute discussed above. See supra note 42.
78. Regulation Z requires that a bank issuing a credit card provide the consumer a written
disclosure that summarizes the applicable legal rules. Regulation Z, §§ 226.5, 226.6. Appendix G to
Regulation Z contains model disclosures. Id. app. G.
79.

TILA, § 1642; Regulation Z, § 226.12(a).

MANN FINAL.DOC

March 2006]

2/17/2006 8:42 AM

“Contracting” for Credit

917

disputes that give consumers a right to cancel payment that is broader than
80
the consumers’ rights in any of the competing payment systems.
Still, the existing framework assumes, at least if the card issuer makes
the required disclosures, that cardholders are best situated to decide with
81
which entities and on which terms to enter card agreements. That framework reflects an almost complete acceptance of the concern that terms
established by government fiat will be less flexible, less innovative, and less
likely to allocate risks sensibly than the terms selected by parties to a freely
82
negotiated commercial arrangement.
The question is whether there is some reason to think that credit card
contracts are sufficiently afflicted by contracting inefficiencies or externalities to warrant spinning them off from the general hands-off realm of
contract enforcement to the realm of interventionist social planning. On the
first of the two points—whether market obstacles prevent efficient contracting—the preceding section of this essay summarizes a number of reasons to
think that the process by which cardholders enter into card agreements does
not function well. On the second one, there also is good reason to think that
the results of that process not only have adverse effects for the cardholders,
but also impose costs on society more broadly. The concern is that the credit
card is so easy to use that borrowers fail to give adequate attention to the
financial distress attendant on their borrowings. Thus, in related work I
show that increased credit card borrowing is uniquely associated with an
increase in personal bankruptcy filings—even when we hold constant the
83
total level of borrowing and account for general conditions in the economy.
Following on that point, the increased financial distress associated with rising card use can cause harms that the borrower might not adequately
84
consider when the borrower makes contracting decisions.
Assuming that some form of economic regulation is called for, it is less
clear precisely what type of intervention makes the most sense. If the existing literature makes anything clear, it is that a sensible intervention must pay
attention to the situation on the ground, lest it end up doing more harm than

80. TILA, §§ 1643, 1666, 1666i. Oddly enough, those provisions might be counterproductive if they encourage consumers to use credit cards instead of debit cards.
81. That is not to say that I think the existing disclosure regime is sensible, see White &
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 260–62 (arguing that the disclosures are too complex to be comprehensible to typical consumers), or that it could not be improved. I argue in related work that the existing
disclosure regime should focus much more on disclosure at the point of purchase (where consumption and borrowing decisions are made) than the existing regime. See Mann, supra note 2, ch. 13.
One of the leading reasons for that recommendation is the view that a shift from credit card usage to
debit card usage would decrease imprudent borrowing.
82. See Craswell, supra note 6, at 49–50 (explaining that problems in market competition for
contract terms do not justify administrative promulgation of terms if the administrative terms will
not be better than the market terms).
83.

See Mann, supra note 2, chs. 4–5.

84. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 56, at 1419–22; Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the
Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995). For a more detailed discussion, see Mann,
supra note 2, ch. 4.
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good. The biggest concern is that a regulatory intervention viewed as a
minor and plainly benign intervention by regulators might in fact undermine
the business models prevalent in the industry in ways that harm competition.
That is a major problem in this context, because the credit card is an espe86
cially efficient payment and borrowing device. Working from that
perspective, the remainder of this essay considers a series of possible responses.
A. Running in Place
To understand the feasibility and effectiveness of interventions in the
credit card market, it is important to understand not only the contracting
problems discussed above, but also some more general difficulties with consumer behavior in that market. Generally, the borrowing problem associated
87
with credit cards arises from two related consumer errors. The first is what
I call the instrument-induced risk. This risk occurs when consumers use a
credit card as a payment device and do not intend to borrow. Because some
evidence suggests that the credit card encourages consumers to spend more
than they otherwise would, and perhaps more than they can repay out of
monthly incomes, credit card use can lead to unanticipated debt. The second
is the convenience risk. Because the transaction costs of credit card lending
are so low, borrowers are more likely to underestimate the risks associated
with future revenue streams than they would be in another type of consumer
credit transaction. Both of those risks arise against a trifurcated framework
that makes the contracting decision less important to most consumers than
the spending and borrowing decisions. Thus, both types of mistakes occur
after the contracting decision has been made. Because existing analyses
have failed to understand that trifurcated framework and its effect on consumer decisionmaking, neither the current regulatory framework nor the
leading proposals in the existing literature respond adequately.
1. Invalidate Unconscionable Terms Ex Post
For example, the simplest possibility is the response of the common law:
ex post judicial invalidation of terms as unconscionable. There is nothing
new about this idea, which dates (at least) to work by Friedrich Kessler in
88
the early 1940s. A similar idea appears in section 211 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. But several considerations limit the effectiveness of
that doctrine as a general tool to police contracting problems. For example,
judicial decisionmaking under a vague rubric of “unconscionability” often
85. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003); Macaulay, supra note 7.
86.

See Mann, supra note 2, ch. 3.

87.

I discuss these two classes or errors in more detail in id. pt. IV.

88. See Friedrich Kessler Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943).
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leads to the disparate readjustment of terms in ways that the parties did not
contemplate in their pricing decisions. Moreover, courts that apply such an
approach with sufficient vigor to have a substantial effect on contracting
practices are likely to do a poor job of sorting provisions that make eco89
nomic sense from those that reflect overreaching.
This is not to say that the unconscionability doctrine can serve no useful
purpose. For example, the unconscionability doctrine might encourage businesses to think more carefully about the enforceability of the clauses that
they write, leading them to use larger print, simpler language, and the like.
However, the doctrine probably does not substantially constrain the major
industry actors, who easily can obtain legislative redress in areas where
90
questionable practices are important to their business models.
In the credit card context, the use of unconscionability as a tool to police
contracting excesses also must overcome the widespread use of arbitration
91
clauses in cardholder agreements. When courts enforce those provisions,
they have no serious opportunity to assess the substantive provisions of
credit card agreements or to consider whether issuers have complied with
92
those provisions. Still, I doubt that judicial or regulatory invalidation of
those provisions will have any substantial impact. For one thing, arbitration
clauses might not contribute to business models that permit excessive cardholder borrowing. Arbitration clauses are at most a detail in the history of
the credit card industry. It is quite clear that most issuers did not use arbitra93
tion clauses in the United States until the late 1990s, and they are used
rarely overseas. Yet the rise in borrowing—and attendant rise in consumer
bankruptcy—that troubles policymakers was well on its way even before
those clauses came into common use. To be sure, arbitration clauses probably deter at least some class actions. But, the class actions that would be
available if the clauses were not enforced would only buttress the weak
89. Jim White has an excellent discussion of the cases interpreting Section 211. James J.
White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 315 (1997); see also Gillette,
supra note 3, at 712–14.
90.

See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 952 (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 7-5-4(c) (2004).

91. Attempts to invalidate arbitration clauses as unconscionable are hampered by the bluntness of unconscionability, discussed above. The unconscionability doctrine works best with a
limited set of problems. Thus, it might be able to respond to procedural defects with the provisions:
lack of mutuality, inconvenient forum, high cost, and the like. See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on those kinds of defects to invalidate PayPal’s arbitration
clause as unconscionable). Courts also arguably can grapple with arbitration clauses that limit substantive rights (i.e., shorten statutes of limitation, bar punitive damages or class actions, or shift
attorney fees). See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Boehr, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). It is more difficult,
though, for courts to address problems with the way arbitration works in practice under seemingly
neutral arbitration provisions (i.e., concerns with secrecy, lack of accountability, and bias). See Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631 (2005).
92. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789704 (arguing that functional judicial
review of arbitration clauses would curtail unscrupulous behavior by card issuers by allowing the
class action lawyer to be an agent for myopic consumers).
93. I rely here on the pleadings in Ross v. Bank of America. Class Action Complaint, Ross v.
Bank of America, No. 05 CV 7116 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint].
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TILA disclosure regime discussed above and increase the ability of cardholders to hold issuers to the terms of the agreements the issuers have
drafted. Thus, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, they
would have little effect on the substance of the relationship.
This is not to say that there are not serious problems with arbitration
clauses in credit card contracting. For example, there is at least some evidence to support the view that issuers have colluded to adopt the clauses
broadly because of concerns that customers care enough to shop for issuers
95
that do not force arbitration. There also is some reason to think that the
problems of bias have a serious effect in this industry, where the major issuers have gravitated to a single provider (the National Arbitration Forum) that
seems to be competing for business (at least in part) on a reputation for pro96
viding results that are satisfying to card issuers.
At bottom, the discussion in Part II suggests that arbitration clauses are
not the result of competitive contracting. It is at least possible, however, that
the cost savings of arbitration are sufficiently valuable that inclusion of the
97
clauses is efficient. Moreover, arbitration proceedings probably could be
constructed in a cost-effective and neutral way if the card networks were
encouraged to intervene. Regardless of the outcome of that debate, it does
not seem likely that prohibiting the use of arbitration provisions or regulating their content will solve the problem of excessive borrowing.
2. Regulating Information
If the existing regulatory regime is inadequate to inform consumers,
even with the buttress of unconscionability doctrine to invalidate egregious
excesses in contracting, the natural question is whether some other information-based initiative could work. The goal would be to solve the borrowing
problem that afflicts card markets without limiting the ability of market participants to design and select products, through the provision of information

94. Issuers might benefit by using arbitration offensively to avoid the ability of cardholders
to raise defenses TILA grants them. For example, arbitrators might be more willing to enforce strict
pleading deadlines, award attorney fees, and the like. Because so much of the collection litigation
revolves around unauthorized use defenses, truncated procedures might dispose of those claims
more expeditiously than litigation.
95. This is the core allegation, as yet unproven, in Ross v. Bank of America. Class Action
Complaint, supra note 87.
96.

Id. Again, this has been alleged, not proven.

97. Arbitration clauses arguably are no worse in the credit card industry than they are in the
many other contexts in which they are common. To be sure, it is easy to think of some contexts in
which it is hard to object to truncated remedies—the terms on which McDonald’s offers prizes to its
customers, for example. The aggregate effect of credit card borrowing makes it hard to put credit
card agreements in that category. Yet, I doubt that credit card transactions are uniquely ill suited to
resolution by arbitration. See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L.
Rev. 723, 742 (“For a nickel or a dime, almost all of us would . . . agree to arbitrate.”); cf. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who
purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be
sued.”).
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that might “debias” consumers and thus overcome the cognitive defects emphasized in Part II of this essay. This is a specific example of the approach
of using information to warn consumers about systematic cognitive errors.
Gabaix and Laibson, for example, talk of required “warning labels” like
98
those we see on cigarettes. As applied to this context, the basic idea is that
warnings of some sort might limit improvident and impulsive spending.
One approach would rely on information campaigns designed to respond
to the availability-heuristic, making consumers more cognizant of the effects
99
of excessive borrowing by telling consumers about them. Yet the parallel to
smoking campaigns illustrates how difficult such a campaign would be. It
has taken decades of concerted effort at all levels of the government to bring
the growth of smoking among young people to something of a standstill—
this for a product without redeeming social value, plainly addictive and associated with the most catastrophic health consequences. Consumer
expenditure and credit, on the other hand, are more ambiguous in their effects on our economy: we can hardly expect the government to urge
100
consumers not to spend. In addition, we certainly cannot expect the government to ban advertisements urging consumers to spend as we have
banned most cigarette advertising. Finally, as Juliet Schor shows so well,
discretionary consumer spending is such an integral part of U.S. culture that
it would be even harder to eradicate it than it has been to slow the growth of
101
smoking. Collectively, those concerns make investment in information
campaigns a poor option.
Another possibility—the focus of existing statutory responses like
TILA—is additional disclosures at the time of contracting. Yet there is little
reason to think that government-drafted summaries of the terms on which
issuers do not compete will make those terms any more important to consumers than they currently are. If, as Part II suggests, consumers choose a
credit card based on a small group of salient characteristics on which card
issuers compete, then disclosures at the point of agreement will do little to
alter consumer decisionmaking.
That is not to say that nothing can be done to improve consumer decisionmaking. For example, if the point of contracting is not a salient point in
the psyche of the consumer, a regime altering the information available at
102
the points of purchase or repayment could be productive. I also think it is
plausible that policymakers could reduce impulsive consumption by efforts
to foster greater segmentation of payment systems (so that fewer people are
using a credit card for everyday purchasing transactions) and by removing

98.

See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57, at 24.

99. See Sunstein, supra note 5 (recommending a campaign that would disseminate “vivid
narratives of possible harm”).
100. See Cohen, supra note 73 (discussing longstanding federal campaign to foster consumer
spending to resuscitate the American economy after World War II).
101.

See Juliet B. Schor, The Overspent American (1998).

102.

I discuss such a regime in Mann, supra note 2, ch. 13.
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and reducing the current monetary incentives to use credit cards. For present purposes, however, the relevant point is that I see no cost-effective way
to use information-based responses to improve the rationality of cardholder
behavior at the point of contracting.
B. Moving Forward
I turn now to the possibilities of direct regulation of the terms of credit
card agreements. Here, I consider two approaches: prohibiting unpriceable
terms and promulgating agreements that provide a standard contractual template for the relationship.
1. Prohibit Specific Terms Ex Ante
The first solution would be to prohibit the use of certain terms. That approach is common in other jurisdictions. Consider, for example, the
104
European Union’s Unfair Terms Directive, which generally prohibits the
inclusion of certain types of unfair terms in consumer contracts unless they
105
are the result of individual negotiation. By U.S. standards, the list is intrusive, prohibiting, among other things, unilateral modification clauses and
106
arbitration clauses.
Such a broad regime might seem almost unthinkable to U.S. businesses.
Yet it is not that different from the regulatory approach in other consumer
financial transactions in which a small number of important issues dominate
the forms. For example, consider the residential lease contract, in which the
most important term for consumer protection purposes is likely to be a warranty of habitability. After a period during which courts struggled with
lessor efforts to waive such a warranty, it is in many jurisdictions now settled by statute or regulation that the lessor of a residence provides such a
107
warranty. Similarly, in the home mortgage context, it is now quite un108
common to see a provision providing for mandatory arbitration.

103.

See id. chs. 11, 14.

104.

Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.

105. As Larry Bates has shown, several other countries have developed administrative approaches under which bureaucrats generally approve form contracts. See Larry Bates,
Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2002). For example, consider Israel’s Standard Contract Law of
1964, which allows users of form contracts to obtain government approval of “restrictive terms.”
Approval immunizes the terms from court challenge for five years. Standard Contracts Law, 57241964, 18 LSI 51 (1963–64) (Isr.).
106. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Annex, 1993
O.J. (L 95) 33 ¶¶ 1(j), 1(q).
107. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 92.006, 92.052 (Vernon 1995) (establishing a nonwaivable warranty of habitability); Slawson, supra note 12, at 49–50.
108. The most obvious reason is that the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA” or
“Fannie Mae”) will not purchase a mortgage that includes such a provision. E.g., Fannie Mae,
Announcement 04-06, at 4–5 (2004), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2004/
fannie-04-06.pdf.

MANN FINAL.DOC

March 2006]

2/17/2006 8:42 AM

“Contracting” for Credit

923

In this context, there are price terms that consumers might assess more
rationally if the contracting process were improved. Provisions that permit
retroactive price adjustments interfere with the ability of consumers to assess the risks of default and nonpayment, because they allow price
adjustments that come into effect after the time of the purchasing decision to
109
which they apply. I call those “unpriceable” terms, not because consumers
can never evaluate them, but because few consumers can be expected to
110
evaluate their significance accurately. That impulse would follow naturally
from the idea that it is appropriate to ban terms whenever it is likely that all
or almost all consumers will not be able to respond accurately to the
111
terms.
Thus, for example, regulators could ban unilateral amendments that apply to prior transactions without allowing consumers a feasible opportunity
112
to opt out. The fifteen-day notice requirement mandated by Regulation Z
gives consumers little time to find alternate credit sources. Depending on the
requirements of the particular opt-out provision, the absence of another
credit source might make compliance with opt-out requirements impractical.
For example, a provision stating that the consumer must repay the entire
balance immediately will not provide a realistic option to a liquidityconstrained customer.
One possible response that might enhance consumer decisionmaking
without significantly restricting the drafting practices of issuers would be to
lengthen notice requirements so that consumers would have additional time
to find alternate credit sources. Going farther, regulators could explore ways
to improve the readability and presentation of change-in-terms notices,
broaden consumer opt-out rights, or even ban post hoc application of unilateral amendments entirely.
A similar example is the “universal default” provisions that are the focus
of current regulatory initiatives. Essentially, universal default terms in credit
card agreements permit an issuer to raise the rate it charges one of its borrowers substantially if that borrower commits a default on an unrelated debt
to a different lender, even if the borrower has not missed a payment to the
credit card issuer in question. It is one thing for an issuer to stop (or raise
the rate on) new extensions of credit based on adverse credit information—
we expect (and hope) that issuers will do that routinely. It is quite another,

109. As I discuss in Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, one might
think that this problem poses an objection to the entirety of the consumer bankruptcy provisions in
the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 J. Theoretical Inquiries in L. (forthcoming
2006).
110. Todd Rakoff refers more elegantly to “invisible” terms—terms the consumer does not
notice. See Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1250–55. I have in mind here a narrower category—terms that
not only are invisible in practice, but that are impossible for a consumer to assess because they
operate ex post facto.
111.

See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 33, at 1456–59; see also Camerer et al., supra note

112.

Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2005).

85.
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however, for creditors to increase the interest rate on debts already incurred,
solely because of a late payment to a different creditor. Regulators, upset by
the application of universal default provisions, have responded by insisting
that credit card issuers provide better disclosure of the provisions in their
113
agreements with customers.
The discussion above suggests that a disclosure regime is not the appropriate response. For one thing, it rests on the premise that consumers that
receive the disclosures will alter their behavior, which is improbable for the
reasons emphasized above. More fundamentally, an emphasis on disclosure
misses the point. My sense is that the underlying complaint of consumers is
that the provisions are fundamentally unfair: “We shouldn’t have to pay
more to Bank One simply because we were late on a payment to Providian.”
Policymakers for the most part have retreated to a disclosure-based response
114
because of their unwillingness to press that fairness argument.
In my view, the discussion above shows how the fairness argument conceals a powerful economic argument for barring universal default
provisions. Universal default rules are one of the attributes consumers are
least likely to “price” in their contracting and product-selection decisions.
This is true because they are a “boilerplate” attribute that will not be of great
significance for most consumers selecting products. It also is true because
the cost of the provision is quite difficult to assess up front (depending, as it
does, on the interaction between future defaults by the borrower to other
lenders and the other lenders’ reactions to those defaults). It is difficult when
I make a purchase today to factor in the likelihood that the interest rate on
that purchase at some distant time in the future will increase by some unspecified amount because of a default I make in a payment to some other
creditor. If an omnicompetent consumer could not take account of the rate
differentiation, then the differentiation is not effectively altering borrowing
behavior. Because consumers are not pricing this term, there is no reason to
rely on its existence in contracts as evidence of its optimality.
The absence of contracting competition does not prove, however, that
the term is not optimal. It is possible that the provisions operate to shift the
net burden of charges by credit card issuers to some extent toward the most
distressed borrowers, the ones most likely to default, and away from those
least likely to default. The increased collections from those customers might
support lower charges for “convenience” users that do not borrow or default.
Thus, it is at least possible that a rational and fully informed cardholder
115
would think the benefits of such a clause exceed its costs.

113. See Linda Punch, Getting Tough?, Credit Card Mgmt., Feb. 2005, at 42, 43–44 (discussing proposals made by the Comptroller of the Currency).
114. There is, however, a bill pending that would ban these provisions entirely, by prohibiting
any alteration of interest rates “for reasons other than actions or omissions of the consumer that are
directly related to [the consumer’s credit card] account.” Consumer Credit Card Protection Act of
2005, H.R. 3492, 109th Cong., § 2 (2005).
115. I discount the possibility that the clause provides signaling benefits by sorting customers
that do not expect to default (who would not be concerned about such a clause) from those that do
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More broadly, universal default provisions are part of the developments
in the credit card market that have fostered segmentation, which has led in
turn to a marked differentiation of rates among cardholders with different
116
risk profiles. As a general matter, that trend is positive, because it permits
more accurate pricing. The role of universal default terms in that market
segmentation depends on the odd ramifications of “default” in the credit
card market. In conventional commercial markets, an act of default by a
borrower is a data point that indicates to the lender that the transaction has
become riskier than previously anticipated and thus more likely to produce a
loss. Typically, lenders respond proactively by managing the transaction in a
117
way that responds to the increased risk of loss. In the credit card context,
however, an event of default (such as a late payment to another creditor or
even a late payment to the card issuer) is a signal that the cardholder is financially constrained. To the issuer, such an occurrence is a signal of two
cardholder attributes that collectively make the cardholder a profit center for
the issuer. First, the cardholder is likely to borrow more in the immediately
ensuing months. Second, the cardholder’s switching costs have increased
because of the difficulty the cardholder will face in repaying the entire outstanding balance in a time of financial distress. Thus, the issuer can respond
by substantially increasing the fees charged to the cardholder with a diminished concern that the cardholder will shift the borrowing to a different
lender. Indeed, one might imagine that a cardholder’s anticipated value as a
customer rises almost to the point of a bankruptcy filing.
The issue, then, is whether it matters that cardholders in fact do not understand the clauses (or their consequences) when they enter the
agreements. Should we prevent this choice on that basis? If we think of this
as tantamount to a unilateral alteration of terms after the fact, we might be
inclined to ban such clauses. On the other hand, if we want to protect the
ability of convenience users to choose a card that might be cheaper for them
because of the increased revenues issuers receive when they exercise unilateral default provisions, we might want to allow them.
An intermediate approach, parallel to the analysis of opt-out clauses
above, would focus on providing cardholders a practical opportunity to respond before adverse action. For example, regulators might forbid issuers to
raise interest rates based on application of a universal default clause without
providing cardholders a substantial notice period, coupled with an opportunity to challenge the relevant information and an opportunity to shift their
outstanding debt to a different issuer.
For me, in the end, the most sensible approach is to ban the clauses entirely. I am driven primarily by my view that convenience users as a class
expect to default (who would be concerned). Tolerance of a clause that goes unread can send no
signal.
116. See Mark Furletti, Payment Cards Ctr., Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Credit Card
Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure (2003).
117. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 159 (1997).
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should be shifted to debit cards and newer payment systems. I recognize
that one likely effect of such a rule would be more extensive and detailed
default clauses, focusing on events internal to the cardholder-issuer relation119
ship. That seems positive, at least in part because of the likelihood that it
would lessen reliance on external sources of information (with questionable
reliability) such as credit reports. Moreover, it might be that cardholders
eventually could come to understand and react to those terms.
Another likely effect would be a contraction of credit (or increase in
price) to the affected borrowers. Again, that response would be beneficial if
financial distress by cardholders imposes costs on society and if current
business models encourage borrowers to wait too long before filing for
bankruptcy. A system that induces issuers to terminate lending earlier might
lower the social costs of financial distress by pressing risky borrowers into
an earlier resolution of their financial affairs.
*****
This discussion is not intended to suggest that universal default provisions are the only—or even the most important—provisions in credit card
agreements that do not advance the social value of the relationship. Rather,
within the brief scope of this essay, the discussion is intended to be exemplary, to illustrate the kinds of provisions that such an approach would ban.
Presumably, the most sensible way to implement such an approach
would be for a relatively well-informed regulator (such as the Federal Re120
serve or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), or, less
plausibly in our current environment, the Federal Trade Commission) to
engage in a cooperative examination, with participation by the affected parties, of the relevant terms. The point here is that a regulator that bans a
particular term that commonly is part of the product is likely to affect the
market for the product in some cognizable way—by either increasing the
121
cost or lowering the amount or quality of the product in some way. The

118.

I discuss that view in more detail in Mann, supra note 2, pt. IV.

119. Of course, in some sense all clauses that define events of default operate to alter the
terms of the relationship after the fact: whenever a borrower fails to make a payment in a timely
manner, the lender is likely to have the right to increase the interest rate that applies to debt that is
outstanding at that time. Universal default clauses are more problematic than the standard clauses,
however, because they extend the definition of default to include events outside the relationship. My
point is not that a creditor reacts irrationally (or unfairly) in concluding that cardholders that are in
default to other creditors are more risky than those that are not in default to any creditor. Rather, the
concern is that most cardholders, most of the time, will not accurately account for this in ordering
their financial affairs. Moreover, few if any of them will price it accurately when they enter into
their cardholder agreements. To that extent, the actual effect of the clause is quite different from the
typical default clause, which in consumer lending agreements focuses almost entirely on a failure to
make timely payment to the creditor.
120. National banks dominate the major card issuers, because only national banks are entitled
to the preemptive provisions of the National Bank Act. Because the OCC regulates all national
banks, the OCC would be in a position to regulate major credit card issuers if it chose to do so. See
Furletti, supra note 77. To date, however, the OCC for the most part has limited itself to safety and
soundness regulation—criticizing practices that might undermine the solvency of the institution
(such as unduly risky lending practices).
121.

See White & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 258–59.
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justification for regulation is the idea that contracting is inherently lawmak122
ing, and that standardized adhesion contracts in practice operate as
“unilateral codes,” by which the parties that promulgate them “usurp the
123
law-making function,” effectively providing “government by private law.”
The idea is not a new one. Indeed, it is at least as old as the work of Arthur Leff, who viewed defective contracts as analogous to defective
124
automobiles. As he explains, the decision a regulator should be making
when it makes such a decision is that consumers are better off with the
higher price (or lower quantity or quality) of the product that comes in a
125
market without the choice to accept the prohibited term. Thus, the discussion above suggests banning universal default terms based on the idea that
the most likely effect would be a contraction of credit in a market that is
both functioning quite poorly and also generating substantial externalities.
The analysis is comparable to the decision of the Department of Transportation to require all cars to have airbags—some of us would buy cars without
airbags, but the government has determined that we all are better off if we
cannot make that choice.
126
There are obvious problems with such an approach. Among other
things, it is not clear that regulators will do a better job than courts in identifying terms to be invalidated. Still, there is at least some reason to believe
that an ex ante approach—that can be applied evenly across contracts and be
incorporated into the price—is preferable, because of the likelihood that the
opportunity for input from affected businesses will lead regulators to avoid
(or quickly repair) truly egregious errors.
2. Standardized Terms
Term invalidation is probably an incomplete response. Another response
127
would be to standardize card agreements. At first glance, that approach
seems more intrusive, because it abandons reliance on the market to develop
the optimal terms. The use of pre-approved terms, however, is the conventional approach for remedying contracting problems in other consumer
finance markets. Indeed, credit card agreements stand out as one of the rare
types of consumer financial transactions that do not proceed on some set of
128
pre-approved terms. Home mortgages are executed almost entirely on the
122.

See Slawson, supra note 6, at 530.

123.

See Schuchman, supra note 53, at 130.

124.

See Leff, supra note 7, at 144–55.

125. Jean Braucher argues that the Federal Trade Commission has been doing something
much like this, and that it did it reasonably well, at least during the 1980s. See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. Rev.
349 (1988).
126.

See Gillette, supra note 3, at 717–19; Leff, supra note 7, at 152.

127. Jeffrey Davis made a similar proposal two decades ago. See Jeffrey Davis, Revamping
Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1333 (1982).
128. The phenomenon is not new. For early discussion, see Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing
of Contracts, 27 Yale L.J. 34, 37–40 (1917); Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1182.
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standard FNMA form. A glance at the form would convince most of us
that—although it suffers from many of the readability problems discussed in
Part I—it is not a form drafted to exploit consumer myopia or cognitive
129
weakness. Similarly, state regulators largely determine the major terms of
130
insurance policies. Major real estate transactions—such as the sale of a
home—typically proceed on forms that are standardized by a government
131
agency or some intermediary that at least in part represents the interests of
132
consumers.
Presumably, a standard account agreement would include mandatory
provisions for the legal aspects of the relationship, with specific options on
issues where there are substantial business reasons for product differentiation. Thus, we might expect two or three variations on the method for
calculating the outstanding balance—one without any grace period, one
with a full grace period, and a moderate provision in between. There also
would be options for the financial terms on which issuers compete, including the interest rate and the amount of annual, late, and overlimit fees.
Such a proposal would respond directly to the problem of multiplicity of
terms and agreements summarized above. Thus, like the FTC Mail-Order
Rule, it would funnel competition among card issuers directly into the attributes for which variation is permitted, predominantly price-related
attributes as to which consumer understanding is heightened and for which
competition is easier to imagine.
To be sure, this solution would do little to decrease complexity. Yet the
relationship necessarily is a complex one. Even if standardization substantially lowered the number of terms that a typical cardholder would need to
understand, it is doubtful that it would simplify the relationship sufficiently
to make a fully competitive cardholder reaction a realistic possibility. The
number of attributes of relevance to a fair assessment of a modern credit
card product, even putting the agreement aside, is sufficiently large as to
make it implausible to think that most cardholders can aggregate and assess
133
the attributes rationally.

129. It is not the point of this essay to argue that those markets function well or that cognitive
problems do not contribute to excessive borrowing in those markets. I do think, however, that much
of the recent controversy in these markets focuses on home equity products, which are less standardized than the first-lien home mortgage markets I discuss in the text. In my view, the greatest cause of
excessive borrowing in the first-lien home mortgage market is likely to be federal intervention (in
the form of loan guarantee programs) that encourages homeowners to borrow funds that private
lenders would not lend.
130. See Abraham, supra note 40, at 32–33; Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1062; Slawson, supra
note 12, at 50–52.
131. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5 (Vernon 2003) (articulating various provisions and
notices that must be used in residential real estate transactions).
132. In many geographic areas, a residential real estate transaction proceeds on a form prepared by a group of real estate brokers. That group might not be biased in favor of consumers—their
primary interest doubtless is to prod the transaction toward consummation (so that a brokerage
commission is due)—but that interest typically results in a reasonably balanced form.
133.

See Grether et al., supra note 49, at 296–97.
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Still, standardization should over time advance cardholder understanding considerably. I think, for example, of the typical apartment lease, a
document of comparable complexity, read directly by few consumers. However, most of us have a reasonable understanding of the typical aspects of
that business relationship, predominantly because the terms are relatively
standardized and stable over time. If the terms of credit cardholder agreements were uniform, we would expect that through experience many
cardholders would come to understand the basic terms that define the events
that lead to late payments, overlimit fees, events of default, and the like.
Given the ways in which multiplicity of terms and term cycling exacerbate
the role of complexity in the existing market, there is good reason to think
that standardization would be helpful.
Further, the oft-cited objections to using mandatory terms are less compelling in this context. The first is the one discussed above, that
standardization will narrow the range of product attributes that issuers can
use to attract and satisfy customers. As suggested in the previous section,
standardization decreases consumer welfare to the extent that it drives at134
tractive products out of the market. In this context, however, firms do not
currently compete to attract customers based on the non-price terms of these
agreements. Indeed, the root of the problem is that there are terms that have
a substantial economic effect that are ignored. A regime that eliminates differentiation on those terms would not make the products less attractive to
most customers. The dominant effect would be a long-term one, in which
customers eventually might come to understand those terms sufficiently to
consider them in assessing the risks and appropriate pricing of their purchasing and borrowing behavior. To the extent that opportunities for
delivering products to particular classes of cardholders are limited, I expect
that the benefits to the cardholders in the mainstream would far exceed the
135
harms.
A more difficult problem is the likelihood that regulators will draft the
terms less capably than card issuers will. The terms will be more obscure,
will not improve over time, will include more unintentional ambiguities, or
will not produce the optimal allocations of risks among the parties. In many
contexts, such concerns would be serious, and the record of obscure drafting
of disclosures by the Federal Reserve should give us pause before seeking
uniform governmental drafting. In this case, however, against the background of existing contract practices, the problems might be less troubling.
For one thing, the discussion above suggests little reason to think that existing terms are drafted with care to be clear and unambiguous or to create an
optimal allocation of risks. Rather, the market currently seems to drive competitive issuers to obscure their terms to escape the notice of their
134.

See id. at 298–99.

135. See Camerer et al., supra note 85. The most obvious potential harm to consumers would
be a contraction of the credit markets in response to limitations on ex post facto terms. My analysis
here assumes that the likely contraction will affect for the most part consumers that are already in
serious financial distress. To the extent lenders stop or limit credit to those people sooner, contraction in fact is likely to be desirable. Mann, supra note 2, ch. 17.
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customers. Moreover, as long as the terms are standardized and within some
broad range of reasonableness, differences in their impact can be treated by
alterations in the price terms that would be left to card issuer discretion
(grace periods, interest rates, amounts of the various fees, and the like).
Still, the problems of government drafting suggest an alternate approach
that might be useful: pressure from federal regulators on the networks to
promulgate uniform terms. Many of the examples to which I refer at the
beginning of this Section do not involve direct government regulation.
Rather, they involve drafting by intermediaries in a framework that motivates the intermediaries to consider the interests of consumers.
In this context, the obvious candidates for standardized drafting would
be Visa and MasterCard. If Visa and MasterCard could be motivated to perceive that the issuance of uniform (and stable) terms on a network-bynetwork basis was a prudent course to avoid federal intervention and government standardization, we might reach the best of all possible outcomes: a
well-drafted and sophisticated allocation of risks, with sufficient stability
that customers could adapt to it. For example, if networks were motivated to
allocate risks efficiently, they might include a low-cost dispute resolution
process like the one used for consumer-merchant disputes governed by
TILA. As Andy Morriss and Jason Korosec illustrate, a side effect of the
provisions of TILA shifting the costs of dispute resolution to card issuers
has been the creation of a highly efficient and technology-driven system for
136
resolving claims of inappropriate charges. A system in which an individual
network committed that its issuers could be held to the terms of their
agreements at least theoretically could be a powerful marketplace tool.
Imagine, for example, if MasterCard advertised that consumers who are
troubled by “unfair late fees” and “unresponsive card issuers” should use
their MasterCard, knowing that they could rely on MasterCard’s consumer
protection guarantee.
At first glance, it might seem difficult to motivate Visa and MasterCard
to implement such a scheme. The history of federal regulation of payment
intermediaries, however, suggests a more optimistic perspective. For example, Stewart Macaulay shows how bitterly card issuers opposed the
137
provisions of TILA that make them responsible for unauthorized use. Today, however, the leading card networks advertise their willingness to accept
responsibility for unauthorized use even more broadly than TILA requires.
Similarly, banks strongly opposed the Expedited Funds Availability Act, but
now offer funds availability schedules far more generous than that statute
138
requires. More generally, a familiar pattern of policy development on the

136. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context:
Structure, Reputation, and Incentives (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper
No. 05-12, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=735283.
137.

See Macaulay, supra note 7.

138. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 23–
29 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4010
(West 2005)).
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Internet has involved extensive initiatives by private intermediaries acting in
139
the shadow of threatened regulation. Thus, just as eBay and the card networks have been persuaded by state regulators to limit their involvement in
activities in ways existing law probably does not require, there is some reason to think that regulatory authorities could persuade Visa and MasterCard
that voluntary “Fair Contracting” initiatives might be a prudent course to
forestall formal regulatory intervention.
Finally, a still narrower solution might avoid the risks of centralized
drafting, but still force the production of terms in a way that makes them
amenable to evaluation by intermediaries. There is some reason to think that
public scrutiny of the terms of cardholder agreements is more effective than
person-by-person negotiation with cardholders. For example, a review of
cardholder agreements used by major issuers indicates that the flurry of
public attention to universal default terms (discussed below) has led at least
one major issuer to agree to provide advance notice before declaring univer140
sal default. The current public attention led to standardization of the time
by which consumers must send payments to avoid late fees—a bright-line
rule, for example, that lenders must treat payments received by mail at 3
141
p.m. or 5 p.m. as made on the date of actual receipt.
The Internet makes broad dissemination of standard terms easier than it
would have been when TILA was enacted. Thus, credit card issuers could be
required to post the major nonprice terms of their agreements in a uniform
format on either their own sites or publicly available Internet sites (such as a
142
site hosted by the FTC, the Federal Reserve, or the OCC). The simplest
approach probably would be to post them on the FTC’s user-friendly website, so that intermediaries reliably could find all of the terms in a single
place. Issuers that wished to do so also of course could post their terms on
their own sites. Indeed, if the FTC required issuers to provide a URL for an
address at which the issuer had posted the terms, it would not matter where
the terms technically were posted, because the FTC site could provide a
catalog of links to the individual postings. The benefit of requiring the terms
to be posted directly at the FTC, however, is that it would facilitate
downloading the terms in a readily analyzable format such as a spreadsheet.
139. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability,
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 239 (2005).
140. See Universal Default, Cardflash: Daily Payment Card News, May 18, 2005, at 2,
http://cardweb.com/cardflash (discussing change in Citibank policy). I find it most unlikely that all
(or even most) issuers will remove these clauses. In the current environment, in which cardholder
agreements—even those used by publicly traded regulated financial institutions—are not available
online, it is difficult to collect specific information on that point.
141. See id. at 1 (discussing Federal Reserve consideration of such a proposal). Any reader
that thinks it is impractical for mail to be processed as quickly as that proposal suggests should
become familiar with Netflix’s mail processing routines. See Netflix.com, How It Works,
http://www.netflix.com/HowItWorks?lnkctr=nmhhiw (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
142. See Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 05-012, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817 (making similar
proposal for electronic contracts).
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Regulators also could require that any set of terms remain in effect for a
certain minimum period (such as 90 days) to facilitate the activity of intermediaries that might examine the postings and provide public assessments
of the various terms. In the current environment, terms are not publicly
available, so consumers do not see them until they have responded positively to a solicitation and received a card, at which point their credit rating
already reflects the extension of credit. Initiatives to educate consumers
about the meaning of unpriceable terms or to persuade responsible issuers to
avoid unpriceable terms can have a positive effect only if it is possible for
consumers to pick among issuers based on the terms. Public disclosure of
the terms is perhaps the simplest way to jump-start such a regime.
Conclusion
Compared to other consumer financial contracts, credit card agreements
are not subject to significant regulatory constraints. Yet, credit card contracts
arguably are the most perilous for consumers, because credit cards are associated with increased consumer spending and financial distress. The risk is
exacerbated by the ability and incentives of sophisticated card issuers, admittedly driven by the business necessities of a continuing credit
relationship, to exploit cardholder relationships. Thus, the realities of credit
card transactions produce a set of dynamic contracting obligations that even
sophisticated cardholders cannot master.
I argue that the juxtaposition of financial peril, market dysfunction, and
lack of regulation should not continue. Thus, I propose the prospective invalidation of terms in cardholder agreements that apply to debts incurred in
connection with previous transactions. A more effective response, however,
would parallel the approach that already exists in most other substantial
consumer financial transactions—a regulatory (or self-regulatory) standardization of cardholder agreements.

